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JOHNY E. McCARROLL et v. LOS AN-
Gin,ES COUN'l'Y DISTIUC'r COUNCIL OI~' CAR-
PENTERS ~ 
Labor- Remedies- Injunctive Relief.-If conduct 
deemed to fall within the Labor 
(29 U.S. §§ 158 (a), 
) , a state court has no to grant injunctive relief 
under either state or federal law, even if the National Labor 
Relations Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction over the 
controversy. 
Id.-Unfair Labor Practices.-Conduct that constitutes breach 
of a collective bargaining contract is not for that reason alone 
an unfair labor practice; enforcement of such contract should 
be left to the usual processes of law, not to the National Labor 
Relations Board. 
[3] Id.-Unfair Labor Practices.-Thnt part of Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, § 8 (b) ( 4) (A) (29 U.S.C. § 158(b) ( 4) (A)), 
making it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization 
to engage in or induce employees to engage in a strike or con-
certed refusal to "perform any service, where an object there-
of is . . . forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other 
person ... to cease doing business with any other person," 
contemplates the existence of a primary employer and a sec-
ondary employer and action by the union to induce employees 
of the secondary employer to cease performing services for 
him in order to compel him to stop doing business with the 
primary employer, the ultimate object of the union's displeas-
ure; it has no application where the conduct alleged consisted 
in calling strikes of certain contractors' employees, and there 
is no suggestion that employees of other employers, either 
general contractors or subcontractors, were induced to refuse 
to perform services. 
[4] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-With reference to a complaint 
alleging that as a result of activities of labor unions certain 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, § 320 
et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 79 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, §§ 148, 
149. 
McK. Dig. References: 18, 19, 29] Labor,§ 25; (2-9] Labor, 
§ 3b; [10-17, 20, 28] Labor, § 24; [21, 22] Arbitration, §§ 9, 15; 
[23-27] Labor, § 3a. 
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contractors will acquire the reputation of being in labor dif-
ficulties and that general contractors will hesitate to do busi-
ness with them, such an effect on secondary employers is al-
ways possible when there is a strike of the employees of a 
primary employer, and is not prohibited by Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, §8(b)(4)(A) (29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4)(A)), 
which permits unions to use such persuasion, whether by direct 
solicitation or by indirect pressure, so long as pressure is not 
brought on the customers by inducing strikes of their own 
employees. 
[5] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-A strike in violation of that 
part of Labor Management Relations Act,§ 8(d) (4) (29 U.S.C. 
§158(d)(4)), providing that where there is in effect a col-
lective bargaining contract covering employees in an industry 
affecting commerce the duty to bargain collectively shall also 
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify 
the contract unless the party desiring such termination or 
modification ''continues in full force and effect, without re-
sorting to strike ... all the terms and conditions of the exist-
ing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is 
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever 
occurs later," is an unfair labor practice, and a strike may 
violate such statutory provision whether or not it also breaches 
a no-strike prov1sion in a collective bargaining agreement; it 
violates such statute when the union has not complied with 
the notice requirements imposed thereby, including the require-
ment that there be no strike before expiration of the contract 
or before a time provided in the contract for reopening nego-
tiations. 
[6] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-Not all strikes during the life 
of a collective bargaining agreement are violations of Labor 
Management Relations Act,§ 8(d) (4) (29 U.S.C. § 158(d) ( 4)); 
a strike called to protest an employer's own unfair labor 
practice, for example, does not violate such statutory pro-
vision because it is not a strike aimed at terminating or 
modifying the contract. 
[7] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-The prohibition of Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, §8(d)(4) (29 U.S.C. §158(d)(4)), 
is confined to "bargaining strikes"; it has no effect on whether 
unions may validly strike over nonbargaining matters. 
[8] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-When a collective bargaining 
agreement is actually in force, Labor Management Relations 
Act, § 8 (d) ( 4), prohibits strikes to compel changes in con-
tractual relations at a time not contemplated by the parties, 
since the assurance of stable labor relations during the life of 
the contract is the principal incentive to entering such a con-
tract in the first place. 
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[9] !d.-Unfair Labor Practices.-A union may bind itself not 
to engage in a strike for any purpose during the life of a 
collective bargaining agreement, but it is only with strikes 
used as a weapon in the bargaining process that Congress has 
in Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(d) (29 U.S.C. § 158 
(d)), shown sufficient concern to make them an unfair labor 
practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National 
Labor Relations Board; a strike concerned with a subject 
wholly ungoverned by the contract and outside the usual sphere 
of collective bargaining does not constitute the unfair labor 
practice of refusing to bargain. 
[10] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-
Labor Management Relations Act, § 30l(a) (29 U.S.C. § 185 
(a)), providing that suits for violations of contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization representing employees 
in an industry affecting commerce may be brought in any 
federal district court having jurisdiction of the parties, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the 
parties, creates a federal substantive law governing collective 
bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce, but state 
courts are not necessarily ousted of jurisdiction to enforce 
such law; if exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts be 
neither express nor implied, the state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction to enforce federal rights whenever, by their own 
Constitution, they are competent to take it. 
[11] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-
Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(a) (29 U.S.C. § 185 
(a)), merely declares that an action for breach of a col-
lective bargaining agreement may be brought in a federal 
court, and enforcement of such agreements in state courts does 
not conflict with any federal policy embodied in § 301 or any 
other part of the federal statute. 
[12] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-
Labor Management Relations Act, § 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185) 
does not confide jurisdiction to one expert tribunal for the de-
velopment of federal policy, but gives jurisdiction to all federal 
district courts, and the possibility of conflict between state 
and federal courts is no greater than the possibility of conflict 
among the federal courts themselves, with uniformity ulti-
mately dependent in either case on review by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
[13] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-
Federal courts are no more expert than state courts in the 
interpretation of contracts. 
[14] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts 
over actions that can be brought in the federal courts under 
Labor Management Relations Act, § 301 (29 U.S. C. § 185) ; 
48 
in this state courts are no 
to apply state the federal law of "v''"~'"" 
bargaining agreements, or the of the litigants' 
rights will on the accident of the in which the 
action is brought. 
!d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courte.-
"'-~·»UHHng that federal courts cannot 
Relations 




are not since it is 
not clear that court to withhold 
a remedy that would be available if the action arose under 
the contract law of the state; Congress can compel a state 
court to enforce a federal right and give a prescribed remedy 
when it is essential to the full realization of the right, and 
the state court would be competent under its own law to give 
a remedy of like character for a right based on state law. 
[16] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-
A state court enforcing a federal right is not simply another 
federal court. 
[17] !d.-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-The Norris-
LaGuardia Act is in terms drawn as a limitation on the fed-
eral courts; it did not limit the remedial power of state courts, 
and could not constitutionally have done so since its prohibi-
tion was not restricted to injunctions in labor disputes affect-
ing interstate commerce or any other subject over which Con-
gress has paramount power. 
[18] !d.-Remedies-Injunctive Relief.-Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, § 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185), does not embody any policy 
that requires a state court enforcing rights created by that 
section to withhold injunctive relief; the principal purpose 
was to facilitate enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments by making unions suable as entities in the federal 
courts, and thereby to remedy the one-sided character of exist-
ing labor legislation; it was not intended to abolish in state 
courts equitable remedres that had been available, and leave 
an employer in a worse position in respect to the effective en-
forcement of his contract than he was before the enactment 
of § 301. 
[19] !d.-Remedies-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief would 
not impair any federal contract right nor expand it in conflict 
with any policy that may be discerned in Labor Management 
Relations Act, § 301 (29 U.S. C. § 185) ; the principal purpose 
of the statute is to encourage the formation and effective en-
forcement of collective agreements, and restriction 
on the remedies available in federal courts arises not from 
any policy in the Labor Management Relations Act itself but 
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from the Norris-LaGuardia of which is confined 
to the federal courts. 
!d.-Jurisdiction of State or Federal Courts.-There is no 
invariable implicit in the federal system that a 
state court a federal right must not go beyond the 
remedies available in a federal court; uniformity in the de-
termination of the federal itself is a necessity, but such 
uniformity is not threatened because a state court can give 
a more complete and effective 
Arbitration- Agreements to Arbitrate- Effect.-The arbi-
of a dispute may itself be subject to arbitration if 
have so provided in their contract, and in this situa-
tion the court should stay proceedings pending the arbiter's 
determination of his own jurisdiction unless it is clear that 
the claim of arbitrability is wholly groundless. 
I d. -Agreements to Arbitrate- Effect.-When the parties 
have conferred on an arbiter the unusual power of determining 
his own jurisdiction, the court cannot avoid the necessity of 
making a certain threshhold determination of arbitrability, 
namely, whether the parties have in fact conferred this power 
on the arbiter. 
Labor-Arbitration.-It may be that leaving to an arbiter 
the question of arbitrability is a desirable procedure from the 
point of view of harmonious labor relations, but since it is 
outside the usual understanding of the relations of court and 
arbiter and their respective functions, it must be assumed 
that the parties expect a court determination of arbitrability 
unless they have clearly stated otherwise. 
[24] !d.-Collective Bargaining Contracts-Arbitration.-Not all 
strikes during the life of a contract are necessarily violations 
of a no-strike clause, though on its face the prohibition ap-
pears to be absolute, and whether a collective bargaining agree-
ment requires arbitration to determine if a union's conduct 
violates the no-strike clause, or whether the court itself may 
make this determination, depends on the intention of the 
parties. 
[25] Id. - Collective Bargaining Contracts - Arbitration. - The 
parties to a collective bargaining contract did not contemplate 
arbitration of a breach of a no-strike clause, though the arbi-
tration provision stated that all grievances or disputes arising 
between the parties over interpretation or application of the 
agreement should be settled by the procedure set forth therein, 
where such procedure was designed primarily to cope with 
the usual employee complaint concerning working conditions, 
[21] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 8 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Arbitration and Award, § 14 et seq. 
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wrongful discharge and the like, and the parties did not in-
tend that an employer would be required to follow these steps 
in prosecuting his objection to a strike. 
(26] !d.-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Arbitration.-Where 
the grievance and arbitration procedure in a collective bar-
gaining agreement was an alternative to the strike as a means 
of settling disputes and assumed that work should go on, resort 
to such procedure was designed to avoid the necessity of a 
strike, not to adjudicate a strike once it occurred, and the 
purpose of the procedure limits its applicability. 
[27] !d.-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Arbitration.-Arbi-
tration provisions in collective bargaining agreements may not 
be construed broadly to cover all disputes between the parties 
to the end that the contract will provide a complete system of 
government for the parties, however attractive may be the 
ideal, since it does not justify overriding the parties' inten-
tions and forcing on them a method of decision wholly unex-
pected in its application. 
[28] Id. -Remedies- Conditions Precedent.-Contractors suiag 
labor unions and their officers for damages and injunctive 
relief against strikes allegedly called by defendants were not 
barred from maintaining the action for failure to have the 
contractor's license required by Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7025-
7031, or the common-law rule that illegal contracts will not be 
enforced, since § 7031 bars actions for the collection of com-
pensation for contracting work, not actions to enforce collec-
tive bargaining agreements, and since plaintiffs' labor contract 
was not prohibited by the licensing statute and its validity was 
llllrelated to the question whether they could legally enter into 
construction contracts. 
[29] Id.- Remedies- Injunctive Relief.-In an action by con-
tractors against labor unions and their officers for damages 
and injunctive relief against strikes allegedly called by de-
fendants, there was sufficient evidence to justify the issuance 
of a preliminary injunction where defendants did not deny 
the strike, the reasons for the strike were obscure, there was 
some indication that defendants objected to plaintiffs on the 
grounds that they were labor contractors and violating state 
safety regulations, but defendants failed to explain precisely 
what labor contracting is, to show that plaintiffs were en-
gaged in it or that defendants were justified in striking rather 
than resorting to the grievance procedure in a collective bar-
gaining agreement, where the evidence tended to show that 
plaintiffs had not violated any state safety regulation, and 
where there was substantial evidence to support plaintiffs' 
claim that the strike was in breach of contract and that they 
would be irreparably injured if it continued. 
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting a preliminary injunction. Phil-
brick McCoy, Judge. Affirmed. 
Arthur Garrett and James M. Nicoson for Appellants. 
Hill, Farrer & Burrill and Ray L. Johnson, 
spondents. 
for Re-
Roth & Bahrs and George 0. Bahrs as Amici Curiae on be-
half of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs are engaged in the contracting 
business in the Los Angeles area. They brought the present 
action against defendant labor unions and their officers for 
damages and injunctive relief against strikes allegedly called 
by defendants. 
In their second amended complaint plaintiffs allege that 
plaintiffs and defendants are parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement known as the BCA-AF of L Master J_~abor Agree-
ment. This agreement provides that a contractor shall have 
complete freedom in hiring workmen, except that he must 
first call on the local union having jurisdiction over the area 
in which the contracting work is to be done to satisfy his 
need for labor. The local union must immediately furnish the 
required number of competent and skilled workmen, and if 
after 48 hours notice it has failed to do so, the contractor is 
free to obtain workmen from any available source. Further-
more, the contractor is permitted to transfer workmen up to 
10 per cent of his current requirements in any craft from 
the jurisdiction of one local union to the jurisdiction of 
another local union. He may transfer more than 10 per cent 
if permitted by the constitution and by-laws of the craft at 
the time the collective bargaining agreement was entered 
into. The by-laws of the Los Angeles County District Council 
of Carpenters permit such a transfer up to 50 per cent of a 
contractor's requirements, and also require a local union to 
honor a contractor's request for specific workmen. The 
agreement also provides that the unions will not call a strike 
against a contractor during the life of the agreement, but that 
all grievances or disputes over the interpretation or applica-
tion of the terms of the agreement will be settled by a specified 
grievance procedure and by arbitration. 
The complaint further alleges that plaintiffs entered into 
contracts to do the carpentry work on various construction 
CARPENTERS C.2d 
area. Pursuant to the collective 
called on defendant local 
unions to supply them with workmen. The workmen sent to 
plaintiffs were, unskilled and incompetent, and 
furthermore defendants informed that they would 
not be permitted to transfer workmen from the 
of one local union to the of another local union 
in excess of 10 per cent of their current De-
fendants also refused to honor 
workmen or to plaintiffs to transfer their regular 
workmen from different of Los Angeles County to 
specific construction projects. Defendants ordered strikes 
of plaintiffs' employees on specific construction projects, and 
finally brought about a strike of all plaintiffs' employees. 
The complaint alleges that the only reasons defendants 
gave for their conduct were that plaintiffs are labor contractors 
and are violating state safety regulations; that in fact plain-
tiffs are not labor contractors since they undertake to do 
complete carpentry jobs and not merely to furnish workmen, 
and that in any event labor contracting is prohibited neither 
by law nor by the collective bargaining agreement; that a 
state safety inspector found that plaintiffs were not violating 
any state safety regulations; and that defendants' purpose 
in calling strikes was to harass plaintiffs and totally destroy 
their business. 
Plaintiffs seek to state three causes of action : breach of the 
collective bargaining agreement through a violation of the 
no-strike clause, a tortious attempt to destroy plaintiffs' busi-
ness without any legitimate labor objective, and a violation 
of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § § 16700-16758) 
by restraining trade without any legitimate labor objective. 
On the basis of the complaint, testimony, and numerous affi-
davits, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction against 
defendants' calling or continuing a strike against plaintiffs, 
and it is from this order that defendants appeal. In view of 
our conclusion that the issuance of the injunction was justi-
fied by the breach of the collective bargaining agreement, 
we do not find it necessary to consider the second and third 
causes of action stated in the complaint. 
Defendants first contend that the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to issue its injunction because the National Labor 
Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct 
alleged in the complaint. [1] It is now well established 
that if conduct may be reasonably deemed to fall within 
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the Labor Relations Act de:fin-
(29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)-(b)), a state 
court has no to injunctive relief under either 
state or federal even if the National I1abor Relations 
Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction over the con-
troversy. (Weber v. 348 U.S. 468, 481 
S.Ct. 99 LEd. ; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations 
353 U.S. 1 S.Ct. 1 hEd 2d 601] ; Charles H. 
Inc. v. Painters Local Union, 45 Cal.2d 677, 681 
P.2d .) The conduct alleged in the present case, 
be deemed to fall within any of 
the of section 8 (b) of the federal act defining 
unfair labor practices by unions. (29 U.S.C. § 158(b).) 
[2] Conduct that constitutes a breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement is not for that reason alone an unfair labor 
Proposals to make breach of contract an unfair 
labor practice were before Congress when it enacted the 
Taft-Hartley law, but were specifically rejected by the con-
ference committee on the ground that once the parties had 
entered into a collective bargaining agreement, enforcement 
should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the 
National Labor Relations Board. (See Association of Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. W estinghonse Elec. Corp., 348 
U.S. 437, 443-444 n. 2 [75 S. Ct. 488, 99 L.Ed. 510] (Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter concurring); Cox and Seidman, Fed-
eralism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 211, 243-245.) 
[3] Defendants contend, however, that the conduct alleged 
falls within the provisions of section 8 (b) ( 4) (A) (29 U.S. C. 
§ 158 (b) ( 4)(A)), which make it an unfair labor practice 
for a labor organization "to engage in, or to induce or 
encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a 
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment 
to ... perform any service, where an object thereof is .. . 
forcing or requiring ... any employer or other person ... to 
cease doing business with any other person .... '' This pro-
hibition contemplates the existence of a primary employer 
and a secondary employer, and action by the union to induce 
the employees of the secondary employer to cease performing 
services for him in order to compel him to stop doing business 
with the primary employer, the ultimate object of the union's 
displeasure. It has no applieation to the present case since 
the conduct alleged consisted in calling strikes only of plain-
tiffs' employees, and there is no suggestion that employees 
of other employers, either general contractors or subcon-
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tractors, were induced to refuse to perform services. (See 
International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. National La,bor 
Rela-tions Board, 341 U.S. 694, 698-706 [71 S.Ct. 954, 95 
L.Ed. 1299]; Na-tional Labor Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. 
& Constr. Tr·acles Council, 341 U.S. 675, 685-690 (71 S.Ct. 
943, 95 L.Ed. 1284]; National Labor Relations Board v. Inter-
national Rice 341 U.S. 665, 670-673 (71 S.Ct. 961, 
95 L.Ed. 1277] ; National La-bor Relations Boa-rd v. General 
Drivers (5th Cir.), 225 F .2d 205, 208-209, cert. denied, 350 
U.S. 914 [76 S.Ct. 100 L.Ed. 801].) 
[4] The complaint does allege that as a result of defend-
ants' activities plaintiffs will acquire the reputation of being 
in labor difficulties, and that general contractors will hesitate 
to do business with them. Such an effect on secondary em-
ployers, however, is always possible when there is a strike 
of the employees of a primary employer, and is not prohibited 
by section 8 (b) ( 4) (A). One of the usual purposes of any 
strike is to make it more difficult for an employer to do 
business by persuading customers not to deal with him. 
Section 8(b) (4) (A) permits unions to use sueh persuasion, 
whether by direct solicitation of the customers or by indirect 
pressures of the kind alleged in the present case, so long as 
pressure is not brought on the customers by inducing strikes 
of their own employees. (National Labor Relations Boa-rd v. 
Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Board (2d 
Cir.), 228 F.2d 553, 556-560, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 [76 
S.Ct. 1024, 100 L.Ed. 1483); Rnbouin v. National La-bor Rela--
tions BonTd (2d Cir.), 195 F.2d 906, 911-912.) Defendants' 
interpretation of section 8(b) (4) (A) is contrary to the au-
thorities and would change it from a prohibition against 
secondary strikes and boycotts to a sweeping prohibition 
against all strikes when an incidental effect is to persuade 
customers not to deal with an employer. 
Sections8(b)(3) and8(d) (29U.S.C. §§158(b)(3), (d)) 
furnish more substantial support for defendants' contention 
that the complaint alleges conduct constituting an unfair labor 
practice. Section 8(b) (3)provides: "It shall be an unfair 
labor practice for a labor organization ... to refuse to bargain 
collectively with an employer. " [5] Section 8 (d) 
provides: 
"to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the employer and the reprrsentative of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and ronfer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
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of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested 
either party, but such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a con-
cession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-
bargaining contract covering employees in an industry af-
fecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also 
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify 
such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or 
modification-
" (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the 
contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty 
days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event 
such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior 
to the time it is proposed to make such termination or 
modification; 
" 
"(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting 
to strike ... all the terms and conditions of the existing con-
tract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given 
or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever 
occurs later .... " 
A strike in violation of section 8 (d) ( 4) is an unfair labor 
practice, and a strike may violate 8 (d) ( 4) whether or not 
it also breaches a no-strike provision in a collective bargain-
ing agreement. A strike violates 8(d) (4) when the union 
has not complied with the notice and waiting requirements 
imposed by the statute, including the requirement that there 
be no strike before the expiration of thr contract or before 
a time provided in the contract for reopening negotiations. 
(See National Labor Rdat·ions Boa1·rl v. Lion Oil Co., 352 
U.S. 282 [77 S.Ct. 330, 332-336. 1 L.Ed.2d 331].) 
[6] All strikes during the life of a collective bargaining 
agreement, however, are not violations of 8 (d) ( 4). A strike 
called to protest an employer's own unfair labor practice, 
for example, does not violate 8 (d) ( 4) because it is not a 
strike aimed at terminating or modifying the contract. (Mas-
tro Plastics Corp. v. Natinnal Labor Relations Board, 350 U.S. 
270, 285-286 [76 S.Ct. 349. 100 L.Ed. 309].) [7] The de-
cision in the Mastro Plastics case, and language in the recent 
Lion Oil case (77 S.Ct. at 335. and Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
concurring and dissenting at 338-341). indicate that the pro-
hibition of 8 (d) is confined to "bargaining strikes." Mr. 
J·nstice Frankfurter points out, 8 (d) "has no effect on whether 
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unions may strike over matters. u (77 
'S.Ct. at 341.) The National Labor Relations Board in its 
opinion in the Lyon Oil case makes it clear that its decision 
"has no bearing on the right to strike for reasons and purposes 
other than to obtain contract modification or termination. 
We say only that strikes to alter the of a firm 
contract of fixed duration ... must await the termination 
date." (Lyon Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 680, 684; see also N a-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Wagner Iron W arks & Bridge 
Workers (7th Cir.), 220 F.2d 126, 141, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
981 [76 S.Ct. 467, 100 L.Ed. 850]; National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Mastro Plastics Corp. (2d Cir.), 214 F.2d 
462,465-466, aff'd, 350 U.S. 270 [76 S.Ct. 349, 100 L.Ed. 309]; 
Snively Groves, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1394, 1395; but cf. Local 
3, United Packinghouse Workers v. National Labor Relations 
Board (8th Cir.), 210 F.2d 325, 332-333, cert. denied, 348 
U.S. 822 [75 S.Ct. 36, 99 L.Ed. 648] ; Penello v. International 
Union, United Mine Workers (D.D.C.) 88 F.Supp. 935, 941.) 
What is a "bargaining strike" in this sense depends on 
the purpose of 8 (d). The federal act seeks to stabilize labor 
relations by encouraging employers and unions to negotiate 
and adhere to collective bargaining agreements covering the 
usual subjects of labor relations, such as wages, hours, and 
working conditions. To this end it compels employer and 
union to substitute to some extent collective bargaining for 
the economic weapons of strike and lockout as a means of 
creating or altering contractual relations, on the theory that 
collective bargaining is more likely to produce a workable 
contract and avoid social and economic disruption. [8] When 
a collective bargaining agreement is actnally in force, the 
statute prohibits strikes to compel changrs in contractual re-
lations at a time not contemplated by the parties, since the 
assurance of stable labor relations during the life of the con-
tract is the principal incentive to entering such a contract in 
the first place. Thus the purpose behind section 8 (d) does 
not encompass strikes whose aim is not to bring about a 
change in contractual relations, such as a strike to compel an 
employer to comply with his contract or to protest conduct 
wholly ungoverned by the contract. [9] A union may of 
course bind itself not to engage in a strike for any purpose 
during the life of the agreement, but it is only with strikes 
used as a weapon in the bargaining process that Congress 
has in 8 (d) shown sufficient concern to make them an unfair 
labor practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National 
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Labor Relations Board. (See Timken Roller Co. v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (6th Cir.), 161 F.2d 949, 953-
955.) 
If the allegations in the complaint are true, the reason 
for the strike in the present case was either defendants' con-
tention that plaintiffs are labor contractors and are violating 
state safety or the of some of 
the individual defendants toward At no time did 
defendants express dissatisfaction with the terms of the con-
tract between the parties or inform plaintiffs of a desire to 
modify it in any regard. The object of the strike appears to 
have concerned a subject wholly ungoverned by the contract 
and outside the usual sphere of collective bargaining. Since 
it was not a strike to terminate or modify the contract, it 
did not constitute the unfair labor practice of refusing to 
bargain. 
Since defendants' conduct as alleged cannot reasonably be 
deemed an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions 
of section 8 (b), it is unnecessary for us to decide whether a 
court has jurisdiction to enjoin conduct that is in breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement and at the same time may be 
reasonably deemed an unfair labor practice. (See I ndepend-
ent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co. (3d Cir.), 
235 F.2d 401; Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co. (4th 
Cir.), 193 F.2d 529; Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Un-
fair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 Colum.L. 
Rev. 52; but see National Labor Relations Board v. Wagner 
Iron Works & Br,idge Workers (7th Cir.), 220 F.2d 126, 137, 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 [76 S.Ct. 466, 467, 100 L.Ed. 850] .) 
[10] Defendants contend that even if this is not a case 
over which the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive 
jurisdiction, since it is an action for breach of a collective 
bargaining agreement it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal courts under section 301 (a) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act. (29 U.S.C. § 185 (a).) Section 301 
(a) provides that: "Suits for violations of contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization representing employees 
in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any 
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of 
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 
From the time of its enactment the federal courts were 
in continual disagreement as to whether section 301 required 
the creation of a characteristically federal decisional law to 
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govern collective bargaining agreements affecting interstate 
commerce, or merely provided a federal forum for the enforce-
ment of substantive rights grounded in the law of the states. 
The majority of the lower federal courts held that section 301 
created substantive rights based on federal law, and did not 
merely confer jurisdiction. Some were persuaded to this 
view by the fear that if section 301 were construed merely 
to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it would eon-
fer upon them jurisdiction over cases not arising under the 
laws of the United States, and thus exceed the scope of the 
judicial power of the United States as defined in article III 
of the federal Constitution. (See Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 
475, United Elec. etc. Workers (2d Cir.), 235 F.2d 298, 300, 
cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. Week 3366 (U.S. June 10, 1957); 
Shirley-Herma-n Co. v. International Hod Carriers (2d Cir.), 
182 F.2d 806, 808-809; International Union of Operating Engi-
neers v. Dahlem Canst. Co. (6th Cir.), 193 F.2d 470. 475; 
United Elec. etc. Workers v. Oliver Corp. (8th Cir.), 205 F.2d 
376, 384-385.) 
Recently the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took 
the position that the supposed constitutional difficulty did not 
exist, since even if an action under 301 is based on state law, 
the case arises under the laws of the United States for the 
purposes of article III if federal court jurisdiction is necessary 
to implement a congressional policy governing collective bar-
gaining agreements affecting interstate commerce. (Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 
576, 580-582, cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21, 
1 L.Ed.2d 37].) This view could have prepared the way 
for an interpretation of 301 that preserved the application of 
state law but provided a federal forum for suits against unions 
that because of procedural obstacles could not be sued as 
entities in the courts of many states. The extremely frag-
mentary legislative history and almost total absence of anv 
direction in the statute as to the content of a federal sub-
stantive law gave considerable support to such an inter-
pretation. (Textile Workers v. American Thread Co. (D. 
Mass.), 113 F.Supp. 137, 139-141; see Association of Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. W estingh01tse Elec. Corp., 348 
U.S. 437, 441-459 [75 S.Ct. 488, 99 L.Ed. 510] (Mr .• JnRtice 
Frankfurter concurring and dissenting) ; Wollett and W el-
lington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 
Stan.L.Rev. 445, 472-475; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 274, 303-
305.) 
McCARROLL v. r.~. A. Com~·ry I~TC. CARPENTERS 59 
f 49 C.2d 45; 315 P.2d 3221 
The United States Supreme Court, however, has now author-
itatively declared that section 301 creates a federal substantive 
law governing collective bargaining agreements affecting inter-
state commerce. (Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala-
ham a, 25 U.S.L. Week 4387 (U.S. June 3, 1957).) Although 
the case before the Court concerned only the power of a 
federal court to give a remedy not available under state law-
speeific t>nforcemcnt of an agreement to arbitrate-the major-
ity opinion broadly states that "the substantive law to apply 
in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law which the courts must 
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.'' ''Federal 
interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. 
I Citation.] But state law, if compatible with the purpose of 
§ 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will 
best effectuate the federal policy. [Citation.] Any state law 
applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not 
be an independent source of private rights." (25 U.S.L. Week 
at 4389.) 
It does not necessarily follow from a decision that federal 
law governs the rights of the parties that state courts are 
ousted of jurisdiction to enforce those rights. As Mr. Justice 
Bradley stated in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 [23 
L.Ed. 833], "[I] f exclusive jurisdiction [in the federal 
courts] be neither express nor implied, the State courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction [to enforce federal rights] whenever, 
by their own constitution, they are competent to take it.'' 
Concurrent jurisdiction exists ''where it is not excluded by 
express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising 
from the nature of the particular case." (See Gerry of Cali-
fornia v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 122-123 [194 P.2d 
689].) 
[11] Section 301 does not expressly exclude state courts. 
On the contrary, it merely declares that an action for breach 
of a collective bargaining agreement may be brought in a 
federal court. Surely if Congress had intended to exclude 
state courts it would have used more forthright language. 
Nor does enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in 
state courts conflict with any federal policy embodied in 
section 301 or any other part of the federal statute. De-
fendants contend that the rationale of Garner v. Teamsters 
etc. Union, 346 U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228], and 
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [75 S.Ct. 480, 
99 L.Ed. 546], which excludes state court jurisdiction over 
unfair labor practices in order that the National Labor 
60 McCARROLL L. A. CouNTY ETC. CARPENTERS [ 49 C.2d 
Relations Board may be free to consistent federal 
exclude state court jurisdiction 
over actions that could be brought under section 301. [12] Sec-
tion 301, however, does not confide jurisdiction to one expert 
tribunal for the of federal policy, but on the 
to all the federal district courts. 
of conflict between state and federal courts is 
no greater than the of conflict among the federal 
courts with ultimately dependent in 
either case on review by the United States Supreme Court. 
[13] Moreover, federal courts are no more expert than state 
courts in the interpretation of contracts. (See Philadelphia 
Marine Trade Assn. v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 
382 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 736-737], cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 7;'511 : General Elec. Co. v. Inter-
national Union United Automobile etc. Workers, [Ohio Ct. 
App.], 108 N.E.2d 211, 219-222, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio 
St. 555 [110 N.E.2d 424] ; Wollett and Wellington, Federal-
ism and B1·each of the Labor Agreement, 7 Stan.L.Rev. 445, 
452-455; but cf. International Plainfield Motor Co. v. Local 
343, Internationa1 Union United Automobile Workers, [D. 
N.J.], 123 F.Supp. 683, 692; note, 57 Yale L.J. 630, 637 
n. 24.) 
[14] State courts therefore have concurrent jurisdiction 
with federal courts over actions that can be brought in the 
federal courts under section 301. It is obvious that in exer-
cising this jurisdiction state courts are no longer free to apply 
state law. but must apply the federal law of collective bar-
gaining agreements, otherwise the scope of the litigants' rights 
will depend on the accident of the forum in which the action 
is brought. What the substantive federal law of collective 
bargaining agreements is we cannot now know. Until it is 
elaborated by the federal courts we assume it does not differ 
significantly from our own law. 
If in the present case it is not necessary to determine 
wherein the substantive federal law differs from the law we 
have until now applied, another problem does press for resolu-
tion: what remedies are available in a state court vindicating 
rights created by section 301? It can be argued that since 
federal courts in actions brought under 301 cannot enjoin 
strikes in breach of a collective bargaining agreement because 
of the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. 
§§ 101, 104), state courts enforcing rights created by 301 like-
wise cannot issue an injunction and give a remedy not avail-
able in the federal courts. 
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Some courts have that section 301 author-
izes even federal courts to use injunctive process for the 
"full enforcement of the substantive rights created by section 
301 (a) . . . , " apparently notwithstanding the restrictions 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. (JJ:filk & Ice Cream Drivers 
Union v. Milk Products Cir.) 203 F.2d 
B50. 651.) we do not pause to decide this question, 
the better view would seem to be that the inclusion of specific 
instances in the Labor Management Relations Act in which 
injunctive relief is expressly authorized negatives any general 
repeal of the Norris-La Guardia Act in respect to the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements. (See W. L. Mead, 
Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1st Cir.), 
217 F.2d 6, 8-10, cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21, 
1 L.Ed.2d 37] ; Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 
(S.D. Cal.), 114 F.Supp. 334, 340-341; United Packinghouse 
Workers v. Wilson & Co., (N.D. Ill.), 80 F.Supp. 563, 567-
568.) By its holding in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama, 25 U.S.L. Week 4387, 4389 (U.S. June 3, 1957), 
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was never intended to prohibit 
specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, the Supreme 
Court has not suggested otherwise ; strike injunctions clearly 
were intended to fall under the ban of the act. 
[15] If it is assumed that federal courts cannot enjoin 
strikes in actions under section 301 save in compliance with 
the strict requirements of the Norris-La Guardia Act, state 
courts enforcing federal rights are not necessarily subject 
to the same restraint. In the first place it is not entirely clear 
that Congress can compel a state court to withhold a remedy 
that would be available if the action arose under the contract 
law of the state. Congress can compel a state court to en-
force a federal right and give a prescribed remedy when it is 
essential to the full realization of the right, and the state 
court would be competent under its own law to give a remedy 
of like character for a right based on state law. (Testa v. 
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 [67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967, 172 A.L.R. 
225] ; Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal.2d 818, 836-851 [142 
P.2d 297].) Moreover, in cases brought in state courts under 
the Federal Employers Liability Act (45 U.S.C. §51 et seq.), 
an area in which the most vexing problems of state enforce-
ment of federal rights have arisen, it has been held that state 
procedure must give way if it impedes the uniform application 
of the federal statute essential to effectuate its purpose, even 
though the procedure would apply to similar actions arising 
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under state law. (E.g. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown 
R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 362-364 [72 S.Ct. 312, 96 L.Ed. 398] .) 
It would be a step beyond these decisions, however, to 
hold that a state enforcing a federal right can be compelled 
to withhold a remedy usually available in its courts, although 
it might be said that since Congress can completely exclude 
state jurisdiction it can dictate that certain remedies be with-
held if necessary to implement federal policy. Some light is 
thrown on this question by Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 [64 
S.Ct. 487. 88 r_,_Ed. 659]. In that case the court held that the 
Federal Bankruptcy Act deprived a state court of power to 
fix or grant fees to counsel for trustees, even though they had 
performed services in actions before the court and under state 
law were entitled to a lien on their client's cause of action. 
(See also Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85 [59 S.Ct. 31, 83 L.Ed. 
56).) This decision, however, does not settle the precise issue 
before us, and a strong argument can be made that Congress 
must take the state courts as it finds them in regard to the 
availability of equitable remedies, and can require only that 
they not discriminate against litigants enforcing federal 
rights. 
In the converse situation, when a federal court enforces 
a state-created right and jurisdiction is based on diversity of 
citizenship, it was established that the court could give an 
equitable remedy not available under state law (Guffey v. 
Smith, 237 U.S. 101 [35 S.Ct. 526, 59 L.Ed. 856); see Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-106 [65 S.Ct. 1464, 
89 L.Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231) ), or withhold a remedy that 
was available under state law. (Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 
261 U.S. 491, 494-499 [43 S.Ct. 454, 67 L.Ed. 763].) Con-
siderable doubt has been cast on the vitality of this doctrine 
by decisions stressing more and more that the goal of diversity 
jurisdiction is substantial similarity of outcome whether an 
action is brought in a state or federal court, and that remedies 
often go to the substance of the right. (E.g. Bernhardt v. 
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202-204 [76 S.Ct. 273, 100 
fJ.Ed. 199] ; cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191-192 
[67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832].) Whatever the implications of 
diversity jurisdiction, however, they do not necessarily de-
termine whether a state court, under the compulsion of the 
supremacy clause, must withhold a specific remedy. [16] A 
state court enforcing a federal right is not simply another 
federal court. (Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 
241 U.S. 211, 222 [36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961] .) 
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The difficulties that inhere in the question of congressional 
power to control equitable remedies available in state courts 
strengthen our conviction that, whether or not Congress could 
nn•~v•nn state courts of the power to give such remedies when 
enforcing collective bargaining agreements, it has not at-
tempted to do so either in the Norris-La Guardia Act or sec-
tion 301. 
[17] The Norris-La Guardia Act is in terms drawn as a 
limitation on the courts of the United States. "No court 
of the United States,'' declares section 1, ''shall have juris-
diction to issue any . . . injunction in a case involving or 
growing out of a labor dispute . . . , '' and a court of the 
United States is defined in section 13 (d) as "any court of the 
United States whose jurisdiction has been or may be conferred 
or defined or limited by Acts of Congress, including the courts 
of the District of Columbia." (29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113(d).) 
'rhe statute aimed to restrict the federal equity power, and 
was justified constitutionally on the basis of Congress' power 
to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. (Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 
321 U.S. 50, 58, 63 [64 S.Ct. 413, 88 L.Ed. 534, 150 A.L.R. 
810] ; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 [58 S.Ct. 
578, 82 L.Ed. 872].) It did not limit the remedial power of 
the state courts (see United Elec. etc. Workers v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., (E.D. Pa.), 65 F.Supp. 420, 422; General 
Bldg. Contractors' Assn. v. Local Unions, 370 Pa. 73 [87 
A.2d 250, 254] ; Markham & Callow, Inc. v. International 
Woodworkers etc. Union, 170 Ore. 517 [135 P.2d 727, 746], 
citing Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction at 220; 
39 Ops. U.S. Atty. Gen. 242, 246), and could not constitu-
tionally have done so since its prohibition was not restricted 
to injunctions in labor disputes affecting interstate commerce 
or any other subject over which Congress has paramount 
power. 
[18] Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
does not embody any policy that requires a state court en-
forcing rights created by that section to withhold injunctive 
relief. The principal purpose of section 301 was to facilitate 
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by mak-
ing unions suable as entities in the federal courts, and there-
by to remedy the one-sided character of existing labor legis-
lation. (See United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., 
(N.D. Ill.), 80 F.Supp. 563, 568.) We would give ?.!together 
too ironic a twist to this purpose if we held that the actual 
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effect of the was to abolish in state courts equit-
able remedies that had been and leave an employer 
in a worse position in to the effective enforcement of 
his contract than he >vas before the enactment of section 301. 
Nothing in the nature of the rights created by section 301 
that relief be denied in their enforcement. 
Such relief would of course not any federal 
contract nor would it expand it in conflict with any 
policy that we have been able to discern in the statute. To 
the contrary, the principal purpose of the statute is to en-
courage the formation and effective enforcement of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. (See Textile Workers v. Lincoln 
Mills of Alabama, 25 U.S.L. Week 4387, 4388 and n. 4 (U.S. 
June 3, 1957).) The restriction on the remedies available in 
the federal courts arises not from any policy in the Labor 
Management Relations Act itself but from the Norris-La 
Guardia Act, and the policy of that statute as we have seen 
is confined to the federal courts. (See .Associated Tel. Co. v. 
Communication Workers, (S.D. Cal.), 114 F.Supp. 334, 341; 
Philadelphia Marine Trade .Assn. v. International Longshore-
men's Assn., 382 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 736], cert. denied, 
350 U.S. 843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 751] ; Wollett and 
Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor Agree-
ment, 7 Stan.I1.Rev. 445, 456-460.) 
[20] Finally, there is no invariable requirement, implicit 
in the federal system, that a state court enforcing a federal 
right must not go beyond the remedies available in a federal 
court. Uniformity in the determination of the substantive 
federal right itself is no doubt a necessity, but such uni-
formity is not threatened because a state court can give a more 
complete and effective remedy. Several federal courts, pro-
ceeding on the hypothesis that substantive rights in actions 
under section 301 arise out of state law, have concluded that 
the federal court is not confined to the remedies available 
in the state courts. (Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. 
General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 94-95, aff'd on other grounds, 
25 U.S.L. Week 4391 (U.S. June 3, 1957); Textile Workers 
v. American Thread Co., (D. Mass), 113 F.Supp. 137, 141; 
See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 
Harv.L.Rev. 591, 601.) We cannot see why, under the opposite 
hypothesis, it is not equally true that a state court is not con-
fined to remedies available in a federal court when the re-
striction on the federal court does not flow from the statute 




the action because the issue involved is re-
to arbitration under the collective bargaining agree-
'l'he issue defendants contend must be arbitrated is 
=""n""" the strike was in breach of the contract. 
III of the contract ''it is the 
and intent of the hereto that all grievances 
rlicnntac between them over the interpretation or 
of the terms of this Agreement shall be settled 
the procedure set forth in Article V hereof, and that dur-
the term of this Agreement the Unions ... shall not .. . 
or engage in, sanction, or assist in a strike against .. . 
Contractors. . . . " Article V is entitled, "Procedure 
Settlement of Grievances and Disputes." In paragraph 
it provides that employees are to present grievances and 
to their craft steward, who will report them to a 
representative. The special representative will then 
to adjust the dispute with the contractor. Para-
e and D provide that if this method of settlement fails, 
the dispute or grievance may be referred to a Joint Con-
ference Board and from there to a Joint Arbitration Com-
mittee. If a majority vote of the Joint Arbitration Com-
mittee cannot be obtained, the grievance or dispute is to be 
submitted to an arbiter whose award is final and binding. 
Paragraph E repeats the provision of article III that all dis-
putes or grievances arising out of the interpretation or ap-
plication of any of the terms or conditions of the contract 
shall be determined by the procedure set forth in article V. 
[21] The arbitrability of a dispute may itself be subject 
to arbitration if the parties have so provided in their contract. 
In this situation the court should stay proceedings pending 
the arbiter's determination of his own jurisdiction unless it is 
clear that the claim of arbitrability is wholly groundless. 
(See International Union, United Automobile Workers v. 
Benton Harbor Malleable Ind1tstries (6th Cir.), 242 F.2d 
539, petition for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. Week 3361 (U.S. 
24, 1957) ; Local 205, United Elec. etc. Workers v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co. (1st Cir.), 233 F.2d 85, 101, aff'd, 25 U.S.L. 
Week 4391 (U.S. June 3, 1957); Scoles, Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U.Chi.L. 
Rev. 616, 620-621.) [22] Of course, even when the parties 
have conferred upon the arbiter the unusual power of de-
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termining his own the court cannot avoid the 
necessity of making a certain threshhold determination of 
arbitrability, namely, v>hether the parties have in fact con-
ferred this power on the arbiter. There is no indication in 
the present contract that the parties intended any such result. 
[23] It may be that leaving to an arbiter the question of 
arbitrability is a desirable procedure from the point of view 
of harmonious labor relations (see Arbitrability, 1951 Report 
of the Committee on Improvement of Administration of 
Union-Employer Contracts, Section of Labor Relations Law, 
American Bar Assn., in Readings on Labor Law 172, 192-194 
(Reynard ed. 1955) ) , although some have expressed fear that 
the procedure may be used to bring about unbargained for 
changes in the relations of the parties. (See minority report 
in id. at 201.) Whatever the merits of the procedure, we 
think it sufficiently outside the usual understanding of the 
relations of court and arbiter and their respective functions 
to assume that the parties expected a court determination 
of arbitrability unless they have clearly stated otherwise. 
(See Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn. v. International Long-
shoremen's Assn., 382 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 738], cert. 
denied, 350 U. S. 843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 751] .) 
Plaintiffs take the position that defendants' breach of con-
tract is not an issue referable to arbitration because by strik-
ing in violation of the no-strike clause defendants have them-
selves repudiated the arbitration procedure. This argument 
misconceives the question since it assumes that defendants 
have in fact breached the no-strike provision, the very issue 
that defendants dispute and say must go to arbitration. 
[24] All strikes during the life of a contract are not neces-
sarily violations of a no-strike clause, even though on its face 
the prohibition appears to be absolute. (See The No-Strike 
Clause, 1952 Report of the Committee on Improvement of Ad-
ministration of Union-Employer Contracts, Section of Labor 
Relations Law, American Bar Assn., in Readings on Labor 
Law 255, 275-277 [Reynard ed. 1955).) The question is 
whether the collective bargaining agreement requires arbitra-
tion to determine if defendants' conduct violates the no-strike 
clause, or whether the court itself may make this determi-
nation. As with all problems of contract interpretation, the 
answer must reflect the intention of the parties. 
This same question has been before the lower federal courts 
on numerous occasions. Many of the decisions, although 
helpful, are not determinative of the problem before us be-
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cause they turn on the language of a particular collective 
bargaining agreement. Some of the decisions are in irre-
concilable confiict.1 
[25] We think the trial court was right in concluding that 
the parties to the contract in the present case did not con-
template arbitration of a breach of the no-strike clause. It 
is true that the language of the arbitration provision is broad, 
stating that ''all grievances or disputes arising between . . . 
[the parties J over the interpretation or application of the 
terms of this Agreement shall be settled by the procedure set 
forth in Article V .... " If this were the only provision 
to be considered, it might reasonably be argued that the 
question of whether a strike is in breach of contract is arbi-
trable since it involves interpretation of a term of the con-
tract. The contract, however, must be read as a whole and 
the grievance and arbitration procedure viewed in the light 
of its purpose. 
The grievance procedure set forth in article V is designed 
primarily to cope with the usual employee complaints con-
cerning working conditions, wrongful discharge, and the like. 
The first steps in the procedure require a grievance to be 
submitted to a craft steward and then reported to a special 
representative for adjustment. It is inconceivable that the 
'International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., (1st 
Cir.) 230 F.2d 576, 582-584, eert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21, 
1 L.Ed.2d 37], (semble: the 1ssue is not arbitrable); Shirley-Herman 
Co. v. International Hod Carriers, (2d Cir.) 182 F.2d 806 (semble: not 
arbitrable); Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, (2d 
Cir.) 202 F.2d 435. 436-437 (not arbitrable); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 
475, United Elec. etc. Workers, (2d Cir.) 23.5 F.2d 298, 301, cert. 
denied, 25 U.S.L. Week 3366 (U.S. June 10, 1957), (arbitrable; pos-
sibly overruling the Shirley-Herman and Markel cases, supra) ;Lewittes 
g- Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F.Supp. 851, 853-854 (S.D. 
N.Y.) (arbitrable); Metal Polishers etc. Union v. Rubin, (E.D. Pa.) 
85 F.Snpp. 363 (not arbitrable) ;Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. 
v. Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Elec. Ry. g- Motorcoach Employees, 
(W.D. Pa.) 98 F.Supp. 789, 791, rev'd on other grounds, (3d Cir.) 193 
F.2d 327 (arbitrable); International Union United Furniture Workers v. 
Colonial Hardu;ood Flooring Co., (4th Cir.) 168 F.2d 33, 35 (not arbi-
trable); United Elec. etc. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, lr10. (4th 
Cir.) 215 F.2d 221, 222-223 (not arhitrable); International Union. 
United Arltomobile Workers v. Benton Harbor Malleable lndrtstries. 
(6th Cir.) 242 F.2d ~36, ;)40-542, petition for eert. filed, 25 U.S.L. Week 
3361 (U.S. May 24. 19!i7), (not arbitrable); Hoover Motor Express Co. 
v. Teamsters etc. Union, (6th Cir.) 217 F.2d 49, 53-54 (not :ubitrahle); 
Square D Co. v. United Elec. etc. Workers, (E.D. Mich.) 123 F.Supp. 
776, 782-783 (not arbitrable); see Philadelphia Marine .Trade Assn. v. 
International Longshoremen's Assn., 3Fi2 Pa. 326 [115 A.2d 733, 737-
738], cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 [76 S.Ct. 84, 100 L.Ed. 751], (semble: 
not arbitrable). 
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to follow these 
strike. It is possible 
that they to be presented di-
to the Joint Conference Board or the Joint Arbitration 
Committee. The later how-
of a 
putes and grievances that are the 
[26] A more 
tion between the grievance and arbitration procedure and the 
no-strike guarantee. The grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure is an alternative to the strike as a means of settling 
disputes, and it is clear that the parties bound themselves to 
resort to this procedure for the very purpose of avoiding the 
possibility of a strike. The parties' intention is shown by the 
fact that defendants' promise in article III not to resort to a 
strike follows immediately after their promise to use the 
grievance procedure. Moreover, the preamble to the con-
tract states that, "it is the desire of the parties hereto to 
provide, establish and put into practice effective methods 
for the settlement of misunderstandings, disputes or griev-
ances between the parties hereto to the end that the Con-
tractors are assured continuity of operation and the members 
of the Unions are assured continuity of employment, and in-
rlustrial peace is maintained .... " The grievance and arbi-
tration procedure assumes that work goes on. Resort to the 
procedure is designed to avoid the necessity of a strike, not 
to adjudicate a strike once it has occurred, and the purpose 
of the procedure limits its applicability. (See International 
Union, United Antornobile Workers v. Benton Harbor Malle-
able Industries (6th Cir.), 242 F.2d 536, 540-541, petition 
for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. Week 3361 (U.S. May 24, 1957).) 
[27] It is urged that arbitration provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements should when possible be construed 
broadly to cover all (iisputes between the parties to the end 
that the contract will provide a complete system of govern-
ment for the parties, a system far more satisfactory than 
any the courts can provide because established by the 
parties themselves. more l to lead to industrial peace. 
We do not dispute the attrarti veness of the ideal. but it does 
not justify overriding the ' intentions and forcing on 
them a method of decision unexpected in its appli-
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cation. As Mr. Justice Cardozo out in Marchant v. 
Jl ead-JJl orris on 252 N.Y. 284 N.E. 386, 391, 
393], "Courts are not at to shirk the process of con-
struction under the empire of a belief that arbitration is 
any more than may shirk it if their belief 
to be the contrary. No one is under a duty to 
resort to these conventional tribunals, however helpful their 
processes, to the extent he has signified his willingness. 
'' '' . . . are not to be trapped 
a strained and unnatural construction of words of doubt-
ful import into an abandonment of legal remedies, unwilled 
and unforeseen.'' 
[28] There is no merit in defendants' contention that be-
cause plaintiffs did not have the contractor's license required 
sections 7025-7031 of the Business and Professions Code, 
they are barred from maintaining the present action by sec-
tion 7031 or the common-law rule that illegal contracts will 
not be enforced. Section 7031 bars actions ''for the collection 
of compensation'' for contracting work, not actions to en-
force collective bargaining agreements. Plaintiffs i!o not seek 
to enforce an illegal contract; their labor contract is not 
prohibited by the licensing statute and its validity is un-
related to the question whether plaintiffs can legally enter 
into construction contracts. If plaintiffs failed to obtain a 
partnership license, they are not for that reason completely 
outside the protection of the law and denied relief from torts 
committed against them or breaches of contract other than 
contracts to recover compensation. (See Grant v. Weather-
hoU, 123 Cal.App.2d 34. 42-44 [266 P.2d 185] .) 
[29] Finally, there was sufficient evidence to justify the 
issuance of the preliminary injunction. Defendants do not 
deny the strike, nor on this appeal do they contend, as they 
did in the trial court, that the contract was not in force at 
the time of the strike or that plaintiffs were not parties to it. 
The reasons for the strike are obscure. There is some indica-
tion that defendants objected to plaintiffs on the grounds that 
they were labor contractors and violating state safety regu-
lations. Defendants failed, however, to explain precisely what 
labor contracting is, to show that plaintiffs were engaged 
in it, or even if they were, that defendants were justified in 
striking rather than resorting to the grievance procedure. 
The evidence tended to show that plaintiffs had not violated 
any state safety regulation. There was substantial evidence 
to support plaintiffs' claim that the strike was in breach of 
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contract and that they would be irreparably injured if it 
continued. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER J.-I dissent. 
In this case the majority holds that where there is a col-
lective bargaining agreement between a union and employer, 
with a no-strike provision, which has been violated by the 
union, but there has been no unfair labor practice under the 
Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.) 
a state court has jurisdiction to give preventive relief against 
such violation; but, however, the federal substantive law 
(29 U.S.C.A. § 185) is exclusively controlling in rights and 
duties under such collective bargaining agreements where 
interstate commerce is affected (Textile Workers Union of 
America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabmna, 353 U.S. 448 [77 
S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972]) ; that state courts have jurisdiction 
generally of proceedings under section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act although they must apply the federal 
substantive law; that in applying such law they (state courts) 
may give whatever form of relief they deem proper, for 
example, injltnctive relief enjoining the violation of a no-
strike provision of the bargaining agreement a.s in the case 
at bar. I cannot agree with this latter holding. On the con-
trary, it is my view that a state court may not give any more 
stringent or different relief than could be given by a federal 
court. 
The rights under the bargaining agreement being con-
trolled by federal law, that law must also measure the remedies 
available for otherwise the federal law is not being applied. 
Turning to the federal law, it is conceded by the majority 
that federal courts could not give injunctive relief under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. It states: 
"Some courts have broadly suggested that section 301 author-
izes even federal courts to use injunctive process for the 'full 
enforcement of the substantive rights created by section 301 
(a) ... ,' apparently notwithstanding the restrictions of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. . . . [T]he better view would 
seem to be that the inclusion of specific instances in the Labor 
Management Relations Act in which injunctive relief is ex-
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(49 C.2d 45; 315 P.2d 322! 
pressly authorized negatives any general repeal of tke Norris-
LaGuardia Act in respect to tke enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements. (See W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters (1st Cir.) 217 F.2d 6, 
8-10, cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21, 1 L.Ed.2d 
37]; Associated Tel. Co. v. Commttnication Workers, (S.D. 
Cal.) 114 F.Supp. 334, 340-341; United Packinghouse Workers 
v. Wi~son &; Co., (N.D. Ill.), 80 F.Supp. 563, 567-568.)" 
(Emphasis added.) The Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 101 et seq.) to which reference is made prohibits injunctive 
relief generally or demands compliance with certain require-
ments before it may be granted. If it is applicable it is 
conceded that an injunction would not be available in this 
case if the action were in the federal court. The majority 
reasons, however, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act relates only 
to the jurisdiction of federal courts, but there is nothing in 
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act which 
forbids an injunction and the purpose of uniformity in the 
disposal of labor relations matters affecting interstate com-
merce is not involved. There are several reasons why those 
arguments are not persuasive. 
In Textae Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama, supra, 353 U.S. 448 [77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972], 
the United States Supreme Court held that substantive fed-
eral law must apply to an action under section 301 to spe-
cifically enforce an arbitration provision in a bargaining 
agreement (the action was in a federal district court) and 
the Norris-La Guardia Act was not a bar because the failure 
to arbitrate was not one of the abuses the Norris Act was 
aimed at and the policy in favor of enforcing such agreements 
expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act was clear, 
but in the course of its opinion there is a clear indication 
that in declaring the federal substantive law applicable it was 
also including so-called procedural matters of importance 
such as injunctive relief. For illustration, the court said: 
''Both the Senate and the House took pains to provide for 
'the usual processes of the law' by provisions which were the 
substantial equivalent of § 301 (a) in its present form. Both 
the Senate Report and the House Report indicate a primary 
concern that unions as well as employees should be bound to 
collective bargaining contracts. But there was also broader 
concern-a concern with a procedure for making such agree-
ments enforceable in the courts by either party. . . . 
"Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is 
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the pro quo for an Viewed 
in this light, the does more 
diction in the federal courts over labor 
expresses a federal that federal courts should 
these agreements on behalf of or labor 
and that industrial peace be best obtained 
way. . . And when in House the debate 
the whether § 301 was more than 
became clear that the purpose of the section was 
to provide the necessary remedies. . .. 
"It seems, clear to us that adopted a 
policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate 
grievance disputes .... Other problems will lie in the pe-
numbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack ex-
press statutory sanction but will be solved by look£ng at the 
policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will 
effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness 
will be determined by the nature of the problem .... Any 
state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law 
and will not be an independent source of private rights.'' 
(Emphasis added.) Indeed the issue involved in the Textile 
case was whether section 301 authorized a particular remedy, 
specific enforcement, in case of breach of a bargaining agree-
ment. I deduce from this that the federal law including the 
remedies available or not available is to be applied when the 
action is in the state court under section 301. 
Moreover, there is additional reason why the remedy such 
as injunction, should not be given by the state court if it 
may not be given by a federal court. Such a remedy is more 
than mere procedure. It goes to the very essence of the right 
itself. In many instances it would make the difference of 
whether or not the right could be truly realized. This is 
especially true in injunctions in labor disputes, such as an 
injunction against a strike. The case is usually won or lost 
at the preliminary injunction stage, even before the hearing 
on the application for a permanent injunction-the final judg-
ment. If a preliminary injunction is obtained, economic cir-
cumstances may break the strike and render impotent the 
efforts of the union to secure the goals sought by it. If it 
is not secured, management and labor continue their bargain-
ing in the manner contemplated by the law. The purpose of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to prevent injunctive restraints 
in such disputes with the thought that management and labor 
may have a free hand to iron out their problems. 
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from 'substantive 
are free to follow 
To what ex-
may themselves dig into 
'substantive is a troublesome at best as is 
shown in the very case on which relies. Central 
Vermont R. Co. v. 238 U.S. 507 S.Ct. 865, 59 
L.Ed. 1433]. Other cases in this Court up the im-
possibility of laying down a rule to distinguish 'sub-
stance' from 'procedure.' Fortunately, we need not attempt 
to do so. A long series of cases decided, from which 
we see no reason to depart, makes it our duty to construe 
the allegations of this complaint ourselves in order to deter-
mine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial 
granted him by Congress. 'l'his cannot be de-
feated by the forms of local (Emphasis added.) 
And it is said: "It follows also from the rule as to supremacy 
of the United States within its proper that the indi-
vidual states may not in any way 
the enjoyment of federal constituiinnal or rights. 
Accordingly, a state may not nny condition requiring 
relinquishment of a the federal Consti-
tution; nor may it snch conditions as it sees fit with 
respect to rights created and cauiles of action conferred by an 
act of congress, or defeat a federal by forms of local 
practice.'' (81 C.J.S., § 7.) It is said in Mine 
Workers v. Arkansas 351 U.S. 62, 75 [76 S.Ct. 
559, 100 L.Ed. 941], "Sueh the case, the state court 
is governed by the federal law which has been applied to 
industrial relations, like these, interstate commerce 
and the state court erred in the peaceful picketing 
here practiced. A 'Sf ate rnay not prohibit the exercise of 
rights which the federal Acts protect.'" (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar the to be not enjoined under the 
Norri::;-Laflnan1ia Art also. 29 .S.C.A. § 1 is a 
part of the federal right-a part and parcel of the rights 
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which may be exercised with reference to bargaining agree-
ments. Certainly a state court cannot give more relief 
(in fact, relief which will be the end of the case) than a 
federal court when administering federal law. If it may, 
the requirement that the federal law be applied may well 
dwindle to nothing and there will be no uniformity as is 
sought by the federal act in labor relations affecting interstate 
commerce. The right will be no greater than the remedy 
afforded for its protection which may vary from state to 
state. If as in Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, supra, 338 
U.S. 294, the mere matter of state rules of pleading may not 
control in the enforcement of a federal law by a state court, 
then certainly the important and fundamental matter of 
allowing an injunction under state law cannot stand if the 
federal law forbids it. In short the federal law is exclusive 
in the field of bargaining agreements affecting commerce. 
When a state entertains jurisdiction and applies that law it 
should be bound by all the important restrictions including 
those embraced in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It would not be 
doubted that if section 301 which gives federal courts juris-
diction over actions involving collective bargaining agree-
ments where interstate commerce is affected, but also provided 
that no injunctive relief was available then no such relief 
would be proper if the action is in a state rather than federal 
court. The fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is in a separate 
statute should not alter the result. 
I would therefore reverse the order granting a preliminary 
injunction. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied October 
8, 1957. Carter, J., was of the opinioll that the petition 
should be granted. 
